




The sociology of knowledge approach to discourse (SKAD)  
 
Abstract: 
The article presents the sociology of knowledge approach to discourse (SKAD). SKAD, which has been in the 
process of development since the middle of the 1990s, is now a widely used framework among social scientists 
in discourse research in the German-speaking area. It links arguments from the social constructionist tradition, 
following Berger and Luckmann, with assumptions based in symbolic interactionism, hermeneutic sociology of 
knowledge, and the concepts of Michel Foucault. It argues thereby for a consistent theoretical and 
methodological grounding of a genuine social sciences perspective on discourse interested in the social 
production, circulation and transformation of knowledge, that is in social relations and politics of knowledge in 
the so-called ‘knowledge societies’. Distancing itself from Critical Discourse Analysis, Linguistics, 
Ethnomethodology inspired discourse analysis and the Analysis of Hegemonies, following Laclau and Mouffe, 
SKAD’s framework has been built up around research questions and concerns located in the social sciences, 
referring to public discourse and arenas as well as to more specific fields of (scientific, religious, etc.) discursive 
struggles and controversies around “problematizations” (Foucault).  
 




1. Sociology of knowledge and the concept of discourse 
 
The field of sociology emerged in the first half of the 19th century with questions about the meaning of, and the 
transformations in, social relations of knowledge (“gesellschaftliche Wissensverhältnisse”).1 Auguste Comte, 
who gave the discipline its name, agreed with other contemporary authors on the three historical stages of 
knowledge (the theocratic, the metaphysical, and the positive stages), which corresponded to particular social 
structures and institutions. This sequence of stages is conceptualized as a history of progression in which 
positive knowledge finally advances to become the dominating social form of knowledge. Not long afterwards, 
in 1845/1846, in The German Ideology, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels outlined the origin of social knowledge 
as coming out of the active, socially mediated, human way of looking at nature, a line of thought that would be 
taken up, and formulated quite differently, decades later within US-American pragmatism. At the beginning of 
the 20th century, Emile Durkheim went against the Kantian postulate of a priori reason in his studies on the 
sociology of religion. Durkheim argued that the categories of time, space, and causality are also the result of a 
social history of knowledge, in which social structures and forms of knowledge as well as the content of 
knowledge are closely interlinked with one another. In the 1920s, Karl Mannheim suggested that sociology 
should study the social location and perspective of all individual and collective knowledge. About the same 
time, Ludwig Fleck presented detailed sociological works on the genesis and discovery of ‘scientific facts’. Max 
Weber’s The Protestant Ethic, a work of discourse analysis avant la lettre, traced the importance of religious 
knowledge back to the dynamics of the development of capitalism. Sociology, as conceived by Weber, is from 
its onset a kind of “Kulturwissenschaft”, since social analyses or interpretations of the world are a central 
subject of analysis. Alfred Schütz, who was interested in the “methodology of understanding”, developed the 
concept of a collective social stock of knowledge from which the acting agents obtain blueprints for their actions 
and analyses of (and in) the world. In the USA, the Chicago School sociologists inquired into the importance of 
human “definitions of the situation” – the concept proposed by William I. Thomas and Dorothy Thomas – for 
sociologically observable actions and behaviours. The subsequent perspective of symbolic interactionism was 
                                                          
1 The term “social relations of knowledge” alludes to Marx’s concept of the “relations of production”. For a 
detailed discussion of the history of sociology of knowledge, including all textual references mentioned below, 
see Keller (2005: 21-96) and Knoblauch (2005: 23-202). 
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then elaborated to conduct research on the interactive and collective consolidation and usage of such 
“definitions of the situation”.  
In the 1960s, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann brought together many of the thoughts of the 
aforementioned sociology of knowledge traditions and neighbouring fields in their influential book, The Social 
Construction of Reality (Berger and Luckmann 1966). In their work, the authors differentiated between, on the 
one hand, society as an “objective reality” which is sedimented within institutions and stocks of knowledge, and 
on the other hand, how the acting subjects appropriate this reality in the diverse socialization processes. Above 
all, Berger and Luckmann emphasize the role of language and the daily “conversation machinery” for the 
construction of a shared social reality. They discussed how knowledge is typified and ‘realized’ through 
interactions and socially objectified in differing processes of institutionalization. It is also reified and becomes 
the foundation of social worlds differentiated by their symbolic horizons. Next, they talked about the 
legitimization of these knowledge/institutional complexes as well as about forms or steps of legitimization, 
which span from the simple usage of particular vocabularies through theoretical postulates and explicit 
legitimization theories to elaborate symbolic subuniverses. These legitimizations are supported by various forms 
of social organization. Along with the analysis regarding the structure of knowledge comes the question about 
the individuals, groups, actors, organizations, practices, artefacts and institutional structures which fix (or 
transform) such orders. The historically situated knowledge order within a society is internalized by the actors 
via socialization processes, and is then reproduced (and occasionally transformed) through the permanent use of 
language or other systems of signs and through nonverbal practices. 
Shortly after the appearance of this influential book, and far removed from any sociology of knowledge context 
(although it did retain echoes of Emile Durkheim), Michel Foucault (1972 [1969]) wrote his The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (see below). 
In the following years, the sociology(ies) of knowledge field would continue to undergo incisive expansion. 
After a series of preliminary works in sociology of science, an empirical approach was developed at the 
beginning of the 1970s for Social Studies of Science which addressed the question of the concrete genesis of 
scientific knowledge. At the same time, researchers of symbolic interactionism established a comprehensive 
programme to analyse the collective battles of interpretation concerning contested social issues or ‘social 
problems’. In the 1980s, Niklas Luhmann integrated a particular sociology of knowledge approach into his 
systems theory around the question of the relationship between “social structure” and “semantics”. He no longer 
referred to a particular social location concerning the usage of knowledge, but rather to the connection between 
functional differentiation and the evolving hegemonic social semantics. In contrast, Pierre Bourdieu insisted, 
somehow more in both the Durkheimian and the Marxist tradition, on the connection between class struggles 
and classification struggles. In German-speaking regions, the hermeneutic sociology of knowledge, based on the 
works of Schütz, Berger and Luckmann, ultimately focused on research-oriented implementations and questions 
of methodology linked to the “social construction of reality”. Along with the focus on knowledge, the concept of 
communication also began to gain increasing importance. At the end of the 1980s, Thomas Luckmann and 
Hubert Knoblauch thus started to speak about the “communicative construction of reality”. They thereby 
highlight the actual forms and processes in which knowledge is socially objectified and then also once more 
subjectively adopted. The sociology of language department within the German Sociological Association 
[Deutsche Gesellschaft für Soziologie] was the first to deal with the questions posed by Knoblauch and 
Luckmann. The official re-naming of this department took place in 2000; hereafter it was labelled “sociology of 
knowledge” (see www.wissenssoziologie.de). This reflects the fact that questions regarding the meaning of 
knowledge and its communicative processes were given greater weight than the earlier influential questions 
about the connection between language use and its embedding within social structures, or those about the formal 
patterns found in communication genres. 
Although Berger and Luckmann highlighted the role of “theoretical conceptions” (ideas, theories, and others) in 
social processes, they emphasized much more that their main interest (and therefore also that of the sociology of 
knowledge inspired by these two authors) applied to ‘common sense’ since in the end this seemed to them the 
most relevant level of social knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 14-15). With few exceptions, the 
hermeneutic sociology of knowledge which follows Berger and Luckmann in German-speaking regions has 
almost exclusively continued to focus on the sociology of knowledge questions discussed here, and therefore on 
common sense knowledge and individuals as the knowledge actors of daily life. In this respect, SKAD, although 
situated in this paradigm of knowledge research, is both an extension and a correction, elaborating on the 
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“objective reality” side of Berger’s and Luckmann’s theory, that is on the (institutional) processes and structures 
in social relations of knowledge, in taking the discursive construction of “objective reality” into consideration.2 
Although it is precisely in the symbolic interactionist’s tradition that the concept of the “universe of discourse” 
and the analysis of public debates, public discourses, and the construction of social problems therein play an 
important role, this sociological paradigm as well as sociology of knowledge itself, regardless of their diversity, 
have not yet developed any genuine sociology of knowledge perspective on the analysis of social discourse. The 
corresponding initiative towards this goal came rather from Michel Foucault. On the one hand, as a philosopher 
working with an historical approach, he developed his discourse analysis about power/knowledge complexes 
quite removed from sociological positions. On the other hand, he can definitely be understood as a 
representative of the Durkheim tradition, which advances a genuine sociology of knowledge analysis of social 
“systems of thought”. Foucault’s fundamental achievement was to look at discourses as socio-historically 
situated “practices”, and not as the development of ideas or lines of argumentation, and to ‘liberate’ discourse 
analysis from the specific linguistic issues. In so doing, he laid important foundations for a sociological analysis 
of discourses. When he argued that his main concern was the “analysis of problematizations” (Foucault 1984), 
that is the appearance of central breaking or turning points in the history of social constitutions of subjectivities 
or particular orders of practice, he came rather close to the interests of the symbolic interactionist. Having 
discussed Foucault’s contributions in more detail in Keller (2005: 122-150; 2008), I want to focus here on the 
following points: in his seminal book The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault (1972 [1969]), reflecting his 
own previous work (especially the Order of things, a historical study of the sciences, published in 1966), 
proposes a theoretical framework which takes ‘discourse’ as its central concept. Discourses are considered as 
historically situated ‘real’ social practices, not representing external objects but constituting them. This implies 
looking at concrete data – oral and written texts, articles, books, discussions, institutions, disciplines – in order 
to analyse ‘bottom up’ how discourses are structured and how they are structuring knowledge domains. Foucault 
speaks of “discursive formations” (p. 34-78) which can be reconstructed, for example the “formation of 
concepts” (which concepts are used and how they relate to each other) or the “formation of enunciative 
modalities” (as the ‘places for speakers’ and the established criteria to access them). His notion of “statement” 
(p. 79-117) refers to the typified core elements of discursive events and concrete utterances. Foucault, in his 
later works, never realized the kind of analysis he projected in the Archeology. But he returned to ‘discourse’ 
several times: L’ordre du discours [The order of discourse], presented as oral communication in 1970 and 
strangely translated as “The Discourse on Language” (included as an appendix in the American translation of 
Archeology, p. 215-238) in fact pursues the framework of discourse research by introducing more explicitly 
ideas of power and mechanisms of the ‘inner structuration’ of discourses (as the “commentary” which, for 
example, differentiates between important statements and the rest). In the Riviere case Foucault (1982 [1973]) 
addresses discourses as battle fields, as power struggles around the legitimate definition of phenomena. This 
comes very close to symbolic interactionist traditions. In other texts, he introduced the notion of the “dispositif” 
(often translated as “apparatus”; see Foucault 1980: 194-228). In French everyday language, the word dispositif 
is commonly used to design a kind of infrastructure which is established by organizations or governments in 
order to fulfil a particular purpose. To give an example: waste incinerators, garbage cans, staff, administrative 
waste regulation, laws – all this is part of the dispositif established for solving some problems emerging because 
of today’s consumer society. 
In later years, Foucault turned to other issues. But the concept of discourse spread, causing a whole field of 
approaches to discourse (Keller 2003), which, to be clear, do not all refer to Foucault. Today, corpus linguistics 
is analysing large corpuses of textual data in order to find statistical correlations between terms used. Discourse 
theory as established by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe addresses discourses as political struggles for 
hegemony. Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) represented by Norman Fairclough in the UK, Ruth Wodak in 
the UK and in Austria or Siegfried Jäger in Germany, originating from within sociolinguistics, establishes a 
critique of ideological functions of language use. And discourse analysis in the tradition of ethnomethodology 
and conversation analysis addresses issues of the ordering of communication in interactional settings, of “text 
and talk in action” (Teun van Dijk). Recent debates in the field have focused on mutual critiques between this 
and more theoretically orientated approaches like Laclau and Mouffe (eg. Jørgensen and Philipps 2002), 
between the ‘all to micro’-orientation on the one hand, the ‘all to macro’ on the other. The main point I want to 
make against all these approaches to discourse refers back to Foucault’s interests in the discursive constitution 
of knowledges, and to Berger and Luckmann’s theory of the social construction of reality. The approaches 
mentioned above cannot (and maybe do not aim to) account for the sociohistorical processings of knowledge 
                                                          




and symbolic orderings in larger institutional fields and social arenas.3 This is particularly clear in research done 
by Critical Discourse Analysis, which implies that the researcher knows and unmasks the ideological and 
strategic use of language by ‘those in power’ in order to ‘manipulate the people’. The sociology of knowledge 
approach to discourse presented in chapter 2 directs its attention, with Berger, Luckmann and Foucault, towards 
the social construction of reality. It gives priority to Berger and Luckmann, because they establish a dialectical 
perspective on society both as “objective reality” and as “subjective reality”, becoming ‘real’ through all kinds 
of knowledge. It uses Foucault’s ideas and concepts – discourse as practice, discursive formation, statement, 
dispositif, discursive battles – in order to explore in more detail the processes of institutionalization and 
transformation of symbolic orderings neglected in the Berger and Luckmann tradition, and it refers to 
methodology and methods of qualitative (interpretative) inquiry, close to the perspective of the latter.4 
 
 
2. The Sociology of Knowledge Approach to Discourse 
 
SKAD is not a method but rather a research programme embedded in the sociology of knowledge tradition in 
order to examine the discursive construction of symbolic orders which occurs in the form of conflicting social 
knowledge relationships and competing politics of knowledge.5 Social relationships of knowledge are complex 
socio-historical constellations of production, stabilization, structuration, and transformation of knowledge within 
a variety of social arenas. In the context of social constructivism, the concept of knowledge not only refers to 
that which counts as socially recognized and confirmed positive knowledge. In fact, it constitutes the entirety of 
all social systems of signs, and in so doing, the symbolic orders and stocks of knowledge constituted by these 
systems which mediate between human beings and the world. Included among these are such things as religious 
doctrine, sociological theory, the interpretative knowledge about social situations, and the larger theorems of 
globalization, freedom, sustainability, and so on. 
SKAD follows Foucault and examines discourses as performative statement practices which constitute reality 
orders and also produce power effects in a conflict-ridden network of social actors, institutional dispositifs, and 
knowledge systems. It is emphasized that discourse is concrete and material, it is not an abstract idea or free 
floating line of arguments. This means that discourse appears as speech, text, discussion, visual image, use of 
symbols, which have to be performed by actors following social instructions and therefore discourses are a real 
social practice. The sociology of knowledge analysis of discourse is concerned with reconstructing the 
processes which occur in social constructions, objectivization, communication, and the legitimization of 
meaning structures or, in other words, of interpretation and acting structures on the institutional, organizational 
or social actors’ level. It is also concerned with the analysis of the social effects of these processes. This 
includes various dimensions of reconstruction: sense making as well as subject formation, ways of acting, 
institutional/structural contexts, and social consequences; how, for example, they become apparent in the form 
of a dispositif (that means: an installed infrastructure designed to ‘solve a problem’, for instance, consisting of a 
law, administrative regulations, staff, things like cars, computers and so on) or in the adoption or rejection by 
social actors in their everyday life (e.g. actors refusing to ‘behave in an environmental-friendly way’). This 
perspective assumes the normality of symbolic battles, contested problematizations, and controversies, of 
competitive discourses, whose manifestations and effects can be traced back only in the rarest cases to the 
dominance and intentions of individual discourse actors (although one can perhaps not dismiss them upfront). 
Sociology of knowledge discourse research analyses social conventions and structuration of symbolic ordering 
as well as the symbolic structuring of social orders. It looks for fixed and fluid rules of interpretation practices 
and takes an interest in the participating actors’ part in conflicts on collective levels of “definition of the 
                                                          
3 In order to avoid confusion: The ethnomethodological tradition of discourse analysis looks for the situational 
producing of ordered verbal interaction and knowledges. This is very useful for in-depth analysis of singular 
discursive events, but it does not (and does not want to) grasp larger historical processes of knowledge 
circulation. 
4 The whole argument as well as references to symbolic interactionism and the comprehensive conceptual 
framework of SKAD is developed in Keller (2005: 179-278).  
5 For the basic principles cf. Keller (1998; 2001, 2003, 2005); for a recent overview on current research cf. 
Keller and Truschkat (2011) as well as the SKAD [WDA: Wissenssoziologische Diskursanalyse] network 
website at www.diskursanalyse.org. 
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(collective’s) situations” (W. I. Thomas and D. Thomas). Last but not least, it targets the materialities of 
discourse, whether they appear as dispositifs (assemblages of actors, practices, things) performing discourse 
production or in the objectivizations and consequences of discursive claims manifesting themselves as artefacts, 
social practices, communication processes and subject positions. These levels can only be briefly outlined here.6 
 
 
2.1.  The Constitution of Meaning in Consciousness 
 
Berger and Luckmann’s theory of knowledge provides a theoretical foundation which considers both the 
institutional knowledge process and the life-world adoption and usage of stocks of knowledge. This explains its 
precedence over Foucault’s approach to discourse which only addresses institutional settings. Along with Alfred 
Schütz, it assumes that meaning is constituted in the human consciousness. Although Schütz, at least in his early 
writings (Schütz 1967 [1932]), does indeed have an excessively rational or cognitive bias (correctable through 
pragmatism) in his emphasis on the conceptual nature of actions (in other words, the assumption that we 
mentally anticipate actions along with their goals and processes and then put them into practice), as well as on 
the importance of “in-order-to” and “because-motives,” this does not detract from his analysis of the role of the 
consciousness in the transformation of sensual experience into conceptual experience. The meaning we ascribe 
to our actions and interactions, social situations and/or the world, is necessarily located in human consciousness. 
Without a process such as the layering of meaning, or the constitution of meaning, there is no separation 
between I and the world, no perception of space, time, the social, and so on. This capacity of the consciousness 
should not be understood as a genuine “production capacity”, as if consciousness creates the existence and the 
meaning of the world out of nothing in an act of solitary, productive creativity. Consciousnesses do indeed draw 
on social interpretation schemata in a fundamental typification process in order to perform their orientation 
capacity. This occurs by means of signs or knowledge schemata, which are taken from the socio-historically 
generated and established collective signs or stocks of knowledge, for the most part primarily within 
socialization processes. The specific, subjective stocks of knowledge of particular individuals are inconsistent, 
heterogeneous, complex sedimentations and actualizations of knowledge triggered from the outside, which 
always exist in a situational, pragmatically motivated relation between focalization and blurry horizons, 
actualized by ‘external’ stimulations.  
George Herbert Mead and the tradition of symbolic interactionism considered in more depth how individual 
competence in the use of signs/knowledge or of significant symbols develops within socialization processes. 
Above all, Mead emphasized the primacy of communication and of the universe(s) of discourse that always 
historically ‘comes before’ the individual.7 The existence of social-symbolic orders – never ultimately achieved 
but always being in the “process of ordering” – and the corresponding communication processes are a necessary 
prerequisite for the development of individual consciousnesses that are capable of intellectual reflection. 
Thought is therefore a form of communication turned inwards. Research into the social phenomenon of 
discourses is obsolete without such a theory of sign-processing consciousnesses (which does not mean that 
everything is already said here).8 Signs as well as the ‘correct ways to use them’ are processed discursively, and 
the corresponding social rules are working as instructions in discursively embedded utterances. Typification 
stocks are nothing more than systems of difference made up of signs which emerge out of the practical usage of 
signs by social collectives and which, through their reciprocal relation or dissociation, both differ from one 
another and, at the same time, constitute each other. Historically, they make up the more or less solidly fixed 
pre-existing ‘supply’ to be used by particular individuals and consciousnesses. The language system of meaning 
                                                          
6  Studies using the SKAD framework focus eg. on environmental politics (Keller 1998), the symbolic 
production of space and cityscapes (Christmann 2004), health care policy (Bechmann 2007), the 
acknowledgement of competency in employment strategies (Truschkat 2008), public discourse on Satanism 
(Schmied-Knittel 2008), identity building in left wing social movements in Germany and Great Britain (Ullrich 
2008) and Chinese migrant communities in Romania (Wundrak 2010), criminology (Singelnstein 2009), same-
sex marriage TV controversies in the US (Zimmermann 2010) or political sciences’ mapping of suicide 
terrorism (Brunner 2010). 
7 To be sure: this is a different concept of discourse as in Foucault’s work. 
8 Consider e.g. the (widely forgotten?) work of Florian Znaniecki on Cultural Reality (Znaniecki 1919) 
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is a pre-condition of the inevitable, necessary ‘desubjectification’ of the individual’s interpretation practice; in 
other words, the historical-social assignation of the possibilities for a ‘subjective’ orientation of individuals in 
the life-world. Its usage always presupposes the participating actors’ capacity for interpretation. Every long-term 
use of signs is a social practice regulated by social conventions. These kinds of convention form the basis of 
discourse practices as a set of instructing rules and are actualized in practical usage, thus simultaneously 
reproduced and altered, or changed, as needed. So the usage of typifications is socially regulated but not 
completely determined. There is therefore in principal a certain amount of freedom in interpretation and action 
in concrete situations as well as a surplus of forms of communication and models for the attribution of meaning. 





I identify discourses, according to Focault, as regulated, structured practices of sign usage. In this regard, 
Foucault’s chief merit is to have brought awareness to the materiality of social signs and idea production, that is, 
to their concrete manifestations in practices, institutional structures, objects, and textual documents. For 
example, a scientific discourse is manifest in texts, conferences, papers, talks, associations and so on which can 
all be studied as data. Furthermore, in his seminal works mentioned above he identified the ways in which they 
can be analysed as emergent discourse formations without recourse to the unmasking of ‘real’ or ‘covert’ 
reasons and intentions of particular social interest groups or actors. He then proposed corresponding dimensions 
of analysis of discursive formations which, when combined with historically situated institutionalization 
processes and the interwoven actions of social actors therein, can be a benefit for sociology. In discourses, the 
use of language or symbols by social actors constitutes the sociocultural facticity of physical and social realities. 
The meaning of signs, symbols, images, gestures, actions or things is more or less fixed in socially, spatially, 
and temporally or historically situated (and therefore transformable) orders of signs. It is affirmed, conserved or 
changed in the concrete usage of the signs. In this respect, every fixed meaning is a snapshot within a social 
process that is capable of generating an endless variety of possible readings and interpretations. Discourses can 
be understood as attempts to freeze meanings or, more generally speaking, to freeze more or less broad symbolic 
orders, that is, fix them in time and by so doing, institutionalize a binding context of meaning, values and 
actions/agency within social collectives. SKAD is concerned with this correlation between the sign usage as a 
social practice and the (re)-production/transformation of social orders of knowledge. It is called the sociology of 
knowledge approach to discourse (analysis) because the perspective towards discourses implied in SKAD can 
be situated in the sociology of knowledge tradition founded by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. This is 
mainly due to SKAD’s research focus and because it benefits from its connection to this tradition. More 
specifically, this approach proposes a perspective on discourse that bridges the gap between either agency or 
structure orientated traditions in sociology of knowledge. By so doing, it is possible to overcome the 
unproductive opposition between approaches which focus on the emergence of collective knowledge orders, as 
Foucault did in The Archaeology of Knowledge, and others which emphasize the social actors’ definition battles, 
for example as in Foucault’s (1982) own writing about the Rivière Case or in the symbolic interactionism 
tradition by Joseph Gusfield (1981) with his analyses of “collective crusades against alcohol abuse”. Indeed, just 
as Berger and Luckmann addressed the manifestation of institutions out of processes of institutionalization, we 
can consider the processing of discourses through society as a dialectical interplay between actors producing 
statements, and the pre-given as well as emerging structurations and sociohistorical means they have to draw 
upon. 
The speaker positions which are available within discursive battles and the corresponding discourse or issue 
arenas, as well as the social actors who are involved within them, are not ‘masters of the discourse universe’, but 
are rather (co-)constituted by the existing structuring of discursive orders or formations. Nevertheless, they in no 
way act as marionettes of discourses’ (or “cultural dopes,” as Garfinkel put it some time ago), but rather as 
lively, interested producers of statements, as articulators with more or less strong resource and creativity 
potentials. The symbolic orders that are produced and transformed in this process constitute the aggregated 
effects of their actions; unambiguous temporary forms of dominance or hegemony are probably rare, but they 
are non-standard configurations that should not be excluded from an empirical point of view. 
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Discourses are simultaneously both an expression and a constitutional prerequisite of the social; they become 
real through the actions of social actors, supply specific knowledge claims and contribute to the liquefaction and 
dissolution of the institutionalized interpretations and apparent unavailabilities. Discourses crystallize and 
constitute themes in a particular form as social interpretation and action issues. Discursive formations are 
discourse groupings which follow the same formation rules. Foucault himself proposed analysing the forming of 
objects, strategies, terminologies, and modalities of enunciation in discourses – primarily considering scientific 
knowledge formations or other ‘truth games’ (Foucault 1972: 34-78). However, he offered very little further 
direction or analytical concepts for this exploration. SKAD therefore supplies additions to this which can only 
be briefly elucidated here. I describe discursive fields as being social arenas, constituting themselves around 
contested issues, controversies, problematizations, and truth claims in which discourses are in reciprocal 
competition with one another. The topics of sociology of knowledge discourse analysis are both public 
discourses as well as special discourses performed in close arenas for special publics. They are analysed with 
regard to their bearer, to matching or differing formation rules and content positionings, as well as to their 
effects. In the processing of discourses, specific discourse coalitions and statement bearers can ‘win out’ over 
others, by a wide range of means. As Thomas Kuhn demonstrated a long time ago for scientific revolutions: 
paradigm shifts don not have to emerge out of arguments; there are all kinds of other reasons. This holds true for 
discourses, too. However, the then occurring discursive formation cannot be understood as an intended and 
controlled effect of individual actors. What is at stake in these discourses is the fixing of collective symbolic 
orders through a more or less accurate repetition and stabilization of the same statements in singular utterances. 
Argumentative consensus building processes as projected in Habermas’s normative discourse ethics, where all 
participants are equal, and the best argument wins, may appear as a very particular and rather seldom occurring 
case in discourse processing. SKAD therefore addresses discourses as complexes of power/knowledge which 
are to be the object not of normative judgement but of empirical inquiry. 
SKAD proposes some more terms in order to analyse utterances that are assumed to be part of the same 
discursive formation. The term discourse itself indicates a structuration context which is the basis of 
disseminated discursive events. The unity of the structuring context, that is, of the discourse in question, should 
be considered as a necessary construct for sociological observation, an essential research hypothesis. In the 
limited sequence of actual utterances (communications), social actors reproduce and transform discourse 
structures through the contingency of historically situated conditions and concrete action while they, with more 
or less excitement and competition, pursue their respective daily routine. Discursive orders are the results of a 
continuous communicative production within individual language and action events which are, however, not 
understood as spontaneous or chaotic, but rather as interwoven, structured practices which refer back to one 
another. Under this definition, discourses are defined as a real, manifest, observable, and describable social 
practice which finds its expression in various documents, in the use of oral and written language, images or 
more generally speaking, in the usage of signs. Discourses are realized through social actors’ communicative 
actions. A pamphlet, a newspaper article or a speech within the context of a demonstration, actualizes, for 
instance, an environmental policy discourse in differing concrete forms and with differing empirical scope. 
Discourses are subject to the conditions of institutional inertia: individual discursive events never actualize and 
reproduce a discourse’s structure in a completely identical way, but rather always in a more or less varied form. 
‘Actualization’ can therefore be understood in two ways: as the transfer of a discourse structure into a real event 
and as the accompanying modification or adaption to the current conditions of a situational context. 
Qualitatively significant discourse transformations can rarely be related to such an individual event. Rather, they 
originate out of the sum of variations, in a kind of switch from the quantitative to the qualitative effect. The 
materiality of discourses (as discursive or non-discursive practices, ‘real speakers’, texts, speeches, discussions, 
things) simply means: the way discourses exist in societies, become ‘real’ in what could be used as ‘possible 
empirical data’. For example, this journal, Human Studies, is one bearer of the materiality of humanities and 
social science discourses, made of paper and papers, editorial board, processes of reviewing and so on. I suggest 
that discursive events, actors, practices, dispositifs, and knowledge structurings are the building blocks of this 
materiality of discourses. Therefore, they should be explained briefly here. 
Discursive events (statement events) create the typifiable material form of utterances, in which a discourse 
appears. In Foucault’s terms (see Foucault 1972: 79-117), an utterance is the concrete, in each case individual, 
singular, and unrepeatable discursive event. On the other hand, a statement is the core of that which is typical 
and can be identified as such in an utterance; the same statement can be made in very different utterances and 
situated forms, and can exist as text, image, graphic or audio-visual data. The relationship between discourse 
and discursive events corresponds to the relationship between structure, or structuring, and individual actions, 
i.e., in the words of Anthony Giddens, to the “duality of structure” (Giddens 1986: 24-26). Structures originate 
out of actions, and in turn, actions originate out of structures in the process of structuring. There is no discourse 
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without statement events; without discourses, statement events could not be understood, typified and interpreted, 
and therefore could not constitute a collective reality. This kind of structure is both structured – i.e., is the result 
of previous structure-forming processes – and structuring in respect to the scopes of future discursive events. 
The real events are not a direct effect of the structural rules, but rather the result of how the social actors actively 
articulate, interpret, and deal with these orientation models. When they are actualized, it is through a (more or 
less) creative and performative achievement on the part of the social actors who draw on resources and use, 
interpret, and (co-)produce them for their practical needs, strategies, tactics and contexts in order to carry out 
their moves. Discourse structures are power structures; discursive conflicts are powerful struggles about the 
power of interpretation and action. 
For producing/articulating interpretations, social actors use the rules and resources that are available as 
discourses in their discursive practice not as deterministic regulation, but as instruction, or they react to them as 
addressees. Only if discourse research accounts for this ‘agency of actors’ it can be understood how the more or 
less creative implementation of such practices happens. SKAD does not hastily mistake the discourse level as 
being a condition of possibilities or limitations of utterances with the factual interpretation and practices of 
social actors. Social actors are not only the empty addressees of knowledge supplies and the value assessments 
embedded therein, but are also socially configured incarnations of agency, according to the socio-historical and 
situational conditions, who more or less obstinately interpret social knowledge supplies as ‘offered rules’ in 
their everyday interpretation activities (Hitzler, Reichertz and Schröer 1999), standing in the crossfire of 
multiple and heterogeneous, maybe even contradicting discourses, trying to handle the situations they meet. 
Social actors (in both the individual or collective form) are related to discourse in two ways: on the one hand, as 
the holders of the speaker position, or statement producers, who speak within a discourse; and on the other 
hand, as addressees of the statement practice. The differentiation between social actors who initially ‘exist‘ 
independent of, or outside of, discourses, and their “discourse specific configuration,” which occurs in the form 
of taking on the available or ‘conquered’ speaker position, is helpful for sociological discourse research. Only 
then can it be taken into account that speakers don’t appear out of nothing in discourses. The sociological 
vocabulary of institutions, organizations, roles, and strategies of the individual or the collective - but always of 
social actors – can be used for a corresponding analysis of the structuration of speaker positions in discourses. 
Through their reflexive and practical interpretations of the structural conditions, they can also cause their 
transformation. 
Social actors are ‘interpellated’ by discourses in some more ways: for example as problem initiators, holders of 
responsibility, objects of necessary interventions or potential consumers of specific services. So the 
contemporary discourse on environmental issues created two central subject positions in the beginning of the 
1970s: that of the individual environmental offender on the one hand, and that of the environmentally 
responsible eco-friendly citizen on the other. We can switch between both interpellations daily, with regard to 
issues like environmentally friendly consumption or household waste separation (see Keller 1998). The way in 
which the addressed adopt the corresponding subject positions, and thus, how they ‘subjectify’ themselves 
according to their elements and rationalities, is not predetermined by this, but rather merits some analysis of its 
own. Dispositifs play a central role here, in other words, institutional and organizational infrastructures that 
offer concrete situational settings for the corresponding programming efforts in the form of buildings, trainers, 
seminars, technologies of the self, codes of practice, laws, participants etc. To summarize, SKAD describes a 
three-fold relationship between discourses and actors: 
 Speaker positions depict positions of legitimate speech acts within discourses which can be taken on 
and interpreted by social actors under specific conditions (for instance, after the acquisition of specific 
qualifications) as role players. 
 Subject positions/Identity offerings depict positioning processes and ‘patterns of subjectivation’ which 
are generated in discourses and which refer to (fields of) addressees. Technologies of the self are 
understood as exemplary elaborate, applicable and available instructions for subjectivation. 
 Social actors are individuals or collectives which draw on the above-mentioned speaker or subject 
positions and, according to their more or less obstinate (role) interpretations and competences, accept, 
effect, translate, adopt, use or oppose them, and therefore ‘realize’ them in a versatile way which 
should be empirically investigated. 
The term practice(s) depicts very generally conventionalized action patterns which are made available in 
collective stocks of knowledge as a repertoire for action, that is, in other words, a more or less explicitly known, 
often incorporated recipe or knowledge script about the ‘proper’ way of acting. This knowledge can originate, 
establish, and develop itself (further) in fields of social practice through experimenting and testing actions in 
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relation to specific issues. SKAD differentiates between several forms of practice: Discursive practices are 
typical, realized communication patterns which are bound to a discourse context. They are not only interesting 
for discourse research as far as their formal process structure is concerned, as in genre theory and conversation 
analysis, but rather equally so in consideration of what was called by Foucault the (socio-historical emergence 
of) rules of formation, their adoption by social actors and their function in discourse production. Discursive 
practices are observable and describable, typical ways of acting out statement production whose implementation 
requires interpretative competence and active shaping by social actors. The social processing of discourses also 
takes place through non-discursive practices, in other words, through ways of acting which do not primarily use 
signs, but which are essential for the statements of a discourse (for example, the construction or assembly of 
measuring instruments in order to prove specific statements about environmental pollution). 
SKAD differentiates between the latter and between model practices generated in discourses, that is, exemplary 
patterns (or templates) for actions which are constituted in discourses for their addressees. To continue with the 
above-mentioned example of environmental discourse, this includes recommendations for forms of eco-friendly 
behaviour (as for example: turning the shower off while you shampoo your hair, using your bike, preparing slow 
food). Similar to the subject positions discussed earlier, one should not think that the model practice will 
actually be implemented simply in the way it was imagined in discourse. Its ‘realization’, that is ‘becoming’ 
real, has to be considered in its own right. 
The social actors who mobilize a discourse and who are mobilized by discourse establish a corresponding 
infrastructure of discourse production and problem solving which can be identified as a dispositif. Michel 
Foucault (1980: 194-228) introduced different notions of dispositifs. SKAD takes up that one which is most 
common in everyday French . ‘Dispositif’ then refers to what could be called an infrastructure established by 
social actors or collectivities in order to solve a particular ‘situation with its inherent problems of action’. 
Consider the state’s need to get some ‘money of its own’: Financial laws, administrative regulation, tax 
authorities, tax assessment, tax investigators all together, mixed up with texts, objects, actions and persons, 
constitute the dispositif in question – a ‘strategic’ ensemble of heterogeneous elements, drawn together, 
arranged in order to manage a situation, to respond to a kind of “urgency” (Michel Foucault). SKAD 
distinguishes between dispositifs of discourse production and dispositifs or infrastructures emerging out of a 
disourse (or out of several discourses) in order to deal with the real world phenomena addressed by the 
discourse in question. A dispositif is both: the institutional foundation, the total of all material, practical, 
personal, cognitive, and normative infrastructure of discourse production, and also the infrastructures of 
implementation emerging out of discursively configured problematizations of fields of practice. Consider the 
issue arena of ‘household waste’, recycling and so on, important issues of public debate and policy decisions in 
recent decades: with reference to the discourse (re)-production level, the discursive interventions of the 
various management, spokespersons, and press committees and also the research centres who diffuse and 
legitimize a specific construction of waste issues through their statements, brochures and so on, should be 
mentioned. With regard to implementation one could include among these, for example, the legal regulation of 
responsibilities, formalized proceedings, specific objects, technologies, sanctions, courses of studies, personal 
and other phenomena. For instance, waste separation systems are part of the dispositif and effects of discourses 
on waste. This includes the corresponding legal regulations, the waste removal company’s staff and, finally, also 
the waste separation and waste cleaning practices to which people submit (or refuse).9 Dispositifs are the real 
means for the realization of the external ‘power-effects’ of a discourse, that is the changes it introduces or elicits 
in the addressed situations and fields of action, be they intentional or non-intended. Dispositifs mediate between 
discourses and fields of practice. SKAD is therefore not just textual analysis of signs in use, communication, text 
or image research. It is simultaneously case study, observation, and even a dense ethnographic description, 
which considers the link between statement events, practices, actors, organizational arrangements, and 
objects as more or less historical and far-reaching socio-spatial processes. 
 
3.  Analysis dimensions 
 
                                                          
9 This should not be considered a one to one translation from discourse to infrastructure, as the latter is rather 
seldom constituted by ‘one discourse’. In waste politics ways to ‘implementation’, there are many interfering 
issues, e.g. financial or hygienic restrictions (embedded in other discursive fields). 
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The sociology of knowledge analysis of discourse considers various analysis dimensions of social relations of 
knowledge and knowledge politics. In particular, this concerns questions not only about the structuring of the 
contents of a discourse (knowledge configurations), the material ‘foundation’ of the utterance production, the 
power-effects which emanate from them, but also about the levels of social macro, meso, and micro discourse 
contexts as well as the general processes of discourse transformation from a historical, spatial and social 
perspective (for example, the transnationalization of discourses, the ‘de-expertization,’ and the like). The first three 
of these dimensions – knowledge configuration, discourse production and power effects – will be discussed in 
more depth below. 
 
3.1  Knowledge configuration 
 
Discourse research interested in knowledge configuration requires exploratory concepts to understand the 
typifiable statement content of a particular utterance. In order to analyse this level of knowledge structuring, I 
propose distinguishing between interpretative schemes or frames, classifications, phenomenal structures 
[Phänomenstrukturen], and narrative structures. Moreover, one can differentiate between (argumentative) 
legitimating elements (for example, scientific, moralistic, and voluntaristic patterns of legitimization), subject 
positions, and discourse-generated model practices as components of phenomenal structures. Together, these 
elements create the interpretative repertoire of a discourse.10 I shall consider these concepts more closely in 
what follows. 
The term interpretative scheme or frame (Deutungsmuster) depicts fundamental meaning and action-generating 
schemata, which are circulated through discourses and make it possible to understand what a phenomenon is all 
about. Discourses link different frames to specific interpretative frameworks. They draw on socially available 
stocks of knowledge; they are also capable, however, of generating new interpretative schemes and of 
positioning those within the social agenda – which is exactly what characterizes discourses. An example of this 
is the interpretative scheme of the “irreducible risk” of complex technologies which has found its way into 
social stocks of knowledge over the last few decades within, and because of, the various environmental 
discourses. A second element for the content-focused analysis of discourses is the exploration of the 
classifications (and therefore qualifications) of phenomena which are performed within them and by them. From 
the social constructionist sociology of knowledge perspective, classifications are a more or less elaborate, 
formalized, and institutionally fixed form of social typification processes. Like every form of sign use, language 
usage within discourses classifies the world, separates it into particular categories which are the foundation for 
its experience, interpretation and way of being dealt with. Competition for such classifications occurs, for 
example, between discourses about how (potential) technical catastrophes should be interpreted, which identity 
offerings can be considered legitimate, what the differences between correct and condemnable behaviour may 
look like, and if perpetrators are certifiably sane or not (one could consider Foucault’s Rivière Case here, see 
Foucault 1982), and so. Classifications have specific impacts for action (see Bowker and Star 2000 or eg. 
Douglas 1966, 1986). 
 
Alongside interpretation schemes and classifications, the concept of phenomenal structure [Phänomenstruktur], 
referring somehow to Karl Mannheim’s classical notion of “Aspektstruktur,” offers a complementary third 
access to the levels of content-related structuring of discourse (see table 1). For instance, constructing a theme as 
a problem on the public agenda, requires that the protagonists deal with the issue in several dimensions, and 
refer to argumentative, dramatizing, and evaluative statements; the determination of the kind of problem or 
theme of a statement unit, the definition of characteristics, causal relations (cause-effect), and their link to 
responsibilities, problem dimensions, value implications, moral and aesthetic judgments, consequences, possible 
courses of action, and others. The phenomena which are constituted by phenomenal structures do not necessarily 
in any way appear as a ‘problem’, even if they are always in a very general way about ‘interpretation and acting 
problems’ to a certain extent – but not in any way necessarily about ‘social’ problems. The existing state of 
discourse research provides insight into some important elements of such phenomenal structures. For example, 
the subject positions constituted by a discourse can be differentiated in a variety of ways. In this way, discourses 
carry out social actors’ positionings as heroes, rescuers, problem cases, sensibly, and responsibly acting 
individuals, villains and so on. However, this does not only occur with regard to the ‘agents’ of the narrative 
which is being offered, but rather also with regard to the various addressees of a discourse. This also includes 
discourse-generated model practices, which provide guidelines or templates for how one should act concerning 
issues about acting that have been defined by the discourse. The concept of phenomenal structure takes on these 
                                                          
10 The term “interpretive repertoire” was coined by Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter, before Potter turned 
to a ‘purer’ ethnomethodologically orientated perspective. Cf. Keller (1998: 36), Wetherell and Potter (1988). 
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kinds of consideration and links them to the fact that discourses, in the constitution of their referential relation 
(and so, their ‘theme’), designate different elements or dimensions of their topic and link them to a specific form 
or to a specific phenomenal constellation. This does not describe any essential qualities of a discourse topic, but 





Dimensions Concrete Implementation  
Causes Waste as "sanitary issue"; discrepancy between amount produced and disposal 
or recycling infrastructure: 
 Wealth growth, economic and technical advances, consumption 
needs of the consumers -> rise in waste produced 
 Waste as a problem of deficient waste disposal at landfills  
 Waste as a problem of a lack of citizen responsibility and discipline  
 Waste as a problem of national payments balance/usage of raw 
materials 
 Waste as a problem of international competitive conditions 
Responsibilities  Politics/government/National administration (must develop and 
enforce a waste politics framework program in coordination with the 
economy)  
 Regional corporations, Economy (individual responsibility for the 
implementation of the political specifications) 
 Citizens/Society (giving up irrational fears and selfish denials; taking 
over responsibility for waste, acceptance of the technologies)  
Need for action/ 
Problem-solving 
Low problem level; technical mastery of the waste issue is possible through 
recycling and elimination; guidelines: 
 Large-scale technological expansion and optimization of the disposal 
and recycling infrastructure 
 Obtaining acceptance of removal infrastructure through the use of 
communication und participation  
 comprehensive mobilization of citizens’ responsibility (local 
authorities, economy, consumers) 
Self-positioning  Representatives of the scientific-technical, economic, and pragmatic 
reason, of civil (socio-cultural/socio-technical) progress 
 Government as the administrator of the collective interest 
Other-positioning  civil actors (regional corporations, economy, citizens) show a lack of 
consciousness for their responsibility, irrational fears, and 
suppression  
 Irrationalism and fundamentalism of German waste politics, disguise 




Not a topic of the waste discussion; follows seemingly “sacrosanct” 
modernization dynamics and market rationalities; material model of affluence; 
freedom of needs (production and consumption)  
Values  Government secures collective interests (affluence, progress, 
modernity) 
 (Actual and moral) cleanliness of the public space 
 Nature as (scarce national) resource, whose usage can be optimized 
 ‘Society as it is right here and now’ as realization of "good life" 
Table 1: Phenomenal structure: Administrative discourse on waste issues, France (taken from Keller 1998: 232) 
 
A final element that is part of the content-related shaping of discourses should be discussed here. The 
structuring moments of statements and discourses, through which various interpretation schemes, classifications, 
and dimensions of the phenomenal structure (for example, actors, problem definitions) are placed in relation to 
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one another in a specific way, can be described as narrative structures. Narrative structures are not simply 
techniques used to link linguistic elements together, but as “mise en intrigue” (emplotment; Paul Ricoeur), as a 
configurative act which links disparate signs and statements in the form of narratives, they are rather also a basic 
modus of the human ordering of the experience of the world (cf. Ricoeur 1984: 5). In the seriality of discursive 
events constituting a discourse, the above mentioned elements of knowledge configuration are tied together in a 
particular ‘narration,’ and are integrated via a common thread, a story line. Narrative structures include 
definable episodes, processes, the personal or the ‘actants’ and their specific positionings, the spatial and 
temporal structures as well as the dramaturgy (the plot) of a story line. In a synchronous perspective, they link 
the various interpretation elements of a discourse into a coherent, portrayable, and communicable form. From a 
diachronic perspective, the actualizations and transformations of the discourses are tied to one another over the 
course of time. They provide the acting schema for the narration with which the discourse can address an 
audience in the first place and with which it can construct its own coherence over the course of time. 
 
3.2.  Discourse production 
Alongside the analysis of knowledge configuration, research into the infrastructures of discourse production 
represents an important component of SKAD. In this case, the research is geared towards looking at the 
interaction between social actors and speaker positions, institutional and organizational arrangements, discursive 
and non-discursive practices as well as artefacts in the utterance processes. As has already been discussed, in 
discourse contexts social actors take on available speaker positions. They do this within the framework of more 
or less wide-reaching institutional/organizational forms; this includes, for example, media arenas, but also 
scientific courses of study and other settings of statement production. This encompasses artefacts (books, 
laboratory instruments, computers, etc.) but also a multitude of discursive and non-discursive practices. 
 
3.3. Power-effects 
Foucault argued that power and knowledge are Siamese twins. Using the notion of ‘power-effects’, SKAD 
refers to different kinds of intended or non-intended consequences emerging out of a discursive field or 
discourse formation, that is the range of ‘changes in the world’ that are linked to the social processing of 
discourses. Discourses lead to inner-worldly consequences in two different respects. They (occasionally) create 
dispositifs or apparatuses of world intervention. This describes infrastructural interconnections between 
personnel (agents), institutional-organizational processes, artefacts, and discursive or non-discursive practices 
that are identified through research and which process the discursively constituted problematizations through 
time, space, and social collectivities and arenas although such devices are rather seldom generated quasi from 
nothing out of a discourse. “Creation” here is always entangled or has to cope with existing institutional-
organizational infrastructures. Social fields of practice often function as mediating instances between number of 
discursive impositions. This also especially applies to the question of the actual and ways of acting which are a 
result of the discursive interpellations, without being controlled by them. Finally, one can assume intended as 
well as unintended aggregate effects, something which was analyzed perhaps most impressively by Max Weber 
in his Protestant Ethic (Weber 2002 [1904/1905]). 
 
 
4.  Interpretative Analytics: Doing SKAD Research 
 
Hermeneutic sociology of knowledge, the current paradigm that emerged from the Berger and Luckmann 
tradition in Germany and which provides the context for SKAD, does not follow the “hermeneutics of 
suspicion” (as Ricoeur called it in the late 1960s, referring, for example, to Marx or Freud; see Ricoeur, 
1970:32-35) which even today informs Critical Discourse Analysis and Laclau and Mouffe orientated discourse 
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research.11 Nor does it look for the only true meaning of what speaking subjects “want to tell us”. Referring to 
‘hermeneutics’ it only insists that any kind of data-oriented research that uses sign-based material requires 
reflected steps of interpretation. The discursive world-making can only be understood through reflexive 
interpretation. In order for sociological practices of interpretation to become scientifically sound, it is necessary 
to accompany and reflect upon interpretation processes by means of methodological provisions – although the 
main goal of the analysis is not ‘the ultimate truth,’ but rather the concept of conceivable ‘good reasons’ for 
socio-historically situated interpretative work. Discourse analyses imply interpretations even when they 
concentrate on formal structures, things or practices. Following the works of Hans-Georg Soeffner, the newer 
sociological hermeneutics is occupied with the possibilities and strategies for the methodical control of 
interpretation processes (cf. Soeffner 1989; Hitzler and Honer 1997). The concept of hermeneutics as “attitude 
and action” (Soeffner and Hitzler 1994) here refers to the ‘understanding of understanding’, and therefore a 
(qualitative) research methodology which, on the one hand, reflects upon the position of the researcher, and, on 
the other hand, develops strategies of data interpretation that focus on the comprehensibility and social 
objectification of the steps of interpretation. Ronald Hitzler and Anne Honer have succinctly formulated this 
position: 
“The basic problem for the sociological researcher when he is reflecting upon his work, is making it 
transparent for himself and for others how he understands that which he believes to understand, and 
how he knows what he thinks he knows. (…) Their claim entails absolutely stripping the basic 
operations in sociological research and theory construction of their epistemological naïveté, to 
reconstruct them and elucidate them.” (Hitzler and Honer 1997: 23f.) 
If sociology seeks to be an empirical science, that is, a specifically reasonable form of reality-related analysis 
versus being a writer’s novel or journalist’s reportage, then the formulated claim of general disclosure and 
transparency of the steps of interpretation must be maintained. This requires a systematic procedure of analysis 
and applies independently of whether or not subjective or collective stocks of knowledge (or the forms of 
externalization/articulation which document them or are indicative of such: books, speeches, newspaper articles, 
films) are analysed. Like Grounded Theory, Conversation Analysis and other qualitative approaches, SKAD 
therefore favours sequential analysis of textual data directed towards its own research questions, to give an 
account of discursive claims and statements beyond the single utterance or discursive event: line by line, step by 
step development, debate and choice of interpretations, in order to build up a socially accountable analysis of 
frames (Deutungsmuster), phenomenal structure, classifications and so on. The open coding procedure 
elaborated by Grounded Theory indicates this way of ‘methods’. In referring to such traditions SKAD takes care 
of the fragile relation between ‘questions towards’ and ‘answers given’ by empirical data. For example, in my 
own research on waste issues, a ‘risk’ frame was elaborated out of newspaper data. This interpretation scheme 
entered German discourses on waste in the early 1980s, and appeared in many different ways: as textual 
utterance, as newspaper title illustration, as scientific analysis of waste incineration; in French discourse on 
waste the main organizing frame to be found was the importance of the French engineers mastering of all kinds 
of technological procedure, including types of waste disposal. 
I speak of interpretative analytics in order to emphasize that discourse research places various data types and 
interpretation steps in relation to one another, for example, more classical sociological strategies of individual 
case analysis or case studies combined with detailed close analyses of textual data. I also speak of interpretative 
analytics, because, in contrast to other qualitative approaches in sociology, SKAD is not per se interested in the 
‘consistency of meaning’ inherent to one particular document of discourse, but rather assumes that such data is 
articulating some (not all) elements’ of discourse or maybe appear as crossing point of several discourses (as 
lots of books or newspaper articles). So discourse research has to break up the material surface unity of 
utterances. The mosaic of the analysed discourse or discourses develops incrementally out of this process – this 
is certainly one of the most important modifications of ‘traditional qualitative approaches’ in the social sciences 
(cf. Keller  2003), which very often take one interview, for example, as a ‘coherent’ and ‘sufficient’ case of its 
own. 
 
SKAD is characterized, like all discourse-focused approaches, by a relation of self-reflexivity. It is no more and 
no less than a discourse about discourses which follows its own discourse production rules, ways of enabling 
                                                          
11 “Hermeneutics of suspicion” refers to a hermeneutic approach which locates the ‘true’ meaning of a text (e.g. 
a book) in something outside the text: as the class position or habitus of its author, or, in psychoanalysis, in its 
unsolved early childhood development experiences. 
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and disciplining. Statements about individual data as well as generalizing hypotheses formulations and 
conclusions must be argued and explained. As the discussion up to this point has illustrated, the questions about 
self-reflexivity and about the constructivism of sociology of knowledge discourse analysis are closely linked to 
one another. Constructivism does not indicate any kind of escape from reality and its occasionally painful 
materiality. Discourses are to begin with positive and materially occurring linguistic actions and communication 
processes which process (disputable) statements and bodies of knowledge. The concrete existence of discourses 
and dispositifs is therefore assumed and in no way disputed. Constructivism, as the basic approach of a 
discourse-theoretical and analytical program, means focusing the analysis on the socially produced ‘order of 
things’ in the medium of discursive knowledge politics, and so to make the contingency of the symbolic order 
the basis for the questions about those processes which it transforms into temporarily fixed crystallizations and 
structural contexts. In this context, neither the resistant character of reality nor the existence of physical 
phenomena and processes that are independent from assignment of meaning are denied. Therefore, not 
everything can be ‘successfully’ said and practically ‘done’ in all kinds of ways about everything. However, the 
criteria for the evaluation of evidence and inconsistencies themselves are a part of discourses, and in this way 
there is no escape from the net of meanings. It cannot be ignored that the SKAD reconstruction work is also 
irreducibly construction work. The interpretation can be called reconstructive because it refers to data and its 
goal is to reveal something about the data’s interrelation and peculiarities (for instance, contained interpretation 
schemes, meaning structurings, and so on). In this general sense, all discourse research necessarily proceeds in a 
reconstructive way. Such analyses proceed constructively (including those in discourse research) because they 
generate interpretations, conceptual schemata, and so on out of the data, and in so doing they generate types of 
statements that were not in the actual data as such and could not have been. Since the construction process is 
determined first of all by the relevancies – the questions, analysis concepts and strategies – of sociological 
discourse research, these are geared towards giving the “field’s own relevancies” a chance. 
One final point should be addressed here. SKAD uses the rich tradition of qualitative data analysis to proceed in 
discourse research. It refers to case studies and fieldwork methods as developed in symbolic interactionism and 
interpretative sociology in order to grasp the materialities and dispositifs of discourse. As mentioned above, it 
uses sequential analysis in order to analyse frames, classifications, phenomenon structures and the like, on the 
utterances level, whether they appear as texts or audio-visual data. It draws upon the strategies of data collection 
and data analysis proposed by grounded theory, first and foremost its ideas of theory-oriented sampling and 
concepts of minimal and maximal contrast in structuring data work (see Strauss 1987: 22-40; Strauss and Corbin 
1998: 201-216). Theoretical sampling means the step-by-step building up of data corpora, in starting analysis 
early and in following argued criteria for continuing data collection. Minimal and maximal contrasting is a 
systematic strategy to cross the field of inquiry in order to establish the range of important findings and to 
achieve detailed accounts of particular elements of analysis. Those strategies, together with sequential analysis 
and coding-like development of concepts (cf. Strauss 1987: 55-81), are established in SKAD in order to account 
for the ‘doing’ of research. That mainly means: to achieve a reasoned analysis where others could agree by 
argument with what is said about one single piece of data or the whole data corpus. To be clear: SKAD, unlike 
Grounded Theory, does not aim to explore particular ‘situations and (inter)actions’, but ‘discourses’. So it does 
not take up the whole of grounded theory research methodology (cf. Keller 2003: 93-108). And it is well aware 
that the idea of ‘complete transparency of research’ works as a guiding horizon that will never be definitely 




SKAD proposes to take seriously Foucault’s interests in discourse as practice of power/knowledge. It therefore 
claims to be more than text or language-in-use analysis: it considers the knowledge side and the ‘power effects 
of discourses’, the infrastructures of discourse production as well as the institutional effects and ‘external’ 
impacts on practice emerging out of discourses meeting fields of practices. Neither linguistic discourse research 
nor Critical Discourse Analysis  (and analysis of discursive hegemonies only to a small extend) are dealing with 
this Foucauldian program. In some way, discourse research in symbolic interactionism always has been much 
closer to Foucault’s arguments than it appeared to be in the disciplinary fights which emerged over recent 
decades between poststructuralism and sociology. Discourses do not speak for themselves, but are rather first 
‘brought to life’ in historically situated processes of interaction and institution building by social actors, and 
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their communication (inter-)acts within pre-existing social fields of practice and institutional structures. These 
are always intersecting orderings of practice or the corresponding ordering processes and efforts, whose actual 
scope probably rarely matches the discursively projected models, and which – as Max Weber already argued a 
hundred years ago – are all more or less transitory (Kendall and Wickham 2001; Law 1994). By taking the ideas 
of power/knowledge and the ‘existence’ of discourses as practices and dispositifs seriously, SKAD is not only 
engaged in researching communication, texts and images, but rather also in dispositif analysis, and thus, in case 
studies, observations, focused ethnography which considers the practical accomplishment of utterances or other 
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